Abstract: The main aim of this article is to examine proposed theses for computation and recursion on concrete and abstract structures. What is generally referred to as Church's Thesis or the Church-Turing Thesis (abbreviated CT here) must be restricted to concrete structures whose objects are finite symbolic configurations of one sort or another. Informal and principled arguments for CT on concrete structures are reviewed. Next, it is argued that proposed generalizations of notions of computation to abstract structures must be considered instead under the general notion of algorithm. However, there is no clear general thesis in sight for that comparable to CT, though there are certain wide classes of algorithms for which plausible theses can be stated. The article concludes with a proposed thesis RT for recursion on abstract structures.
1. Introduction. The concepts of recursion and computation were closely intertwined from the beginning of the efforts early in the 1930s to obtain a conceptual analysis of the informal notion of effective calculability. I provide a review of those efforts in sec. 2 as background to the remainder of this article, but I have nothing new to add here to the extensive historical and analytical literature.
1 It is generally agreed that the conceptual analysis of effective calculability was first provided most convincingly by Turing (1936-7) . Not long before that Church (1936) had proposed identifying effective calculability with the Herbrand-Gödel notion of general recursiveness, soon enough proved equivalent to Turing computability among other suggested explications. Curiously, the subject of effective computation came mostly to be called Recursion Theory, even though that is only one of the possible forms of its development.
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In his influential book, Introduction to Metamathematics, Kleene (1952) baptized the statement that every effectively calculable function is general recursive as Church's 1 Gandy (1988) is an excellent introductory source to those developments; cf. also Soare (1999) . 2 Soare in his articles (1996, 1999) has justifiably made considerable efforts to reconfigure the terminology of the subject so as to emphasize its roots in the notion of computation rather than recursion, for example to write 'c.e.' for 'computably enumerable' in place of 'r.e.' for 'recursively enumerable', but they do not seem to have overcome the weight of tradition.
Thesis. He went on to baptize as Turing's Thesis the statement that "every function which would naturally be regarded as computable is computable …by one of his machines" and to say that this is equivalent to Church's Thesis, since the general recursive functions are exactly the same as the (total) functions computable by Turing machines. This led Kleene to speak further on in his book in ambiguous terms of the Church-Turing Thesis. Among workers in recursion theory it is common to take Church's Thesis and Turing's Thesis to be equivalent for the same reason as given by Kleene, and to follow him in referring to them without distinction as Church's Thesis or as the Church-Turing Thesis; I shall also use 'CT' ambiguously as an abbreviation for either of these.
3
My main concern in this article is to examine proposed theses for computation and recursion on both concrete and abstract structures. By concrete structures I mean those given by sets of finite symbolic configurations (e.g., finite strings, trees, graphs, hereditarily finite sets, etc.) together with the appropriate tests and operations for their transformation. In sec. 3 I review efforts to "prove" CT for computation on concrete structures that began with Gandy (1980) and were later pursued by Sieg as well as Dershowitz and Gurevich (references below), among others. The approaches in question proceed by isolating basic properties of the informal notion of effective calculability or computation in axiomatic form and proving that any function computed according to those axioms is Turing computable. It is not my aim here to argue for one or another of these approaches but rather to emphasize what they hold in common (and what is usually taken for granted), namely that in whatever way one understands CT, there is no calculation without representation, i.e. it is a necessary ingredient of whatever constitutes effective calculability that one operates only on finite symbolic configurations by means that directly transform such configurations into new ones using appropriate tests along the way.
Beginning in the late 1950s a number of generalizations of the notions of computation and recursion were made to a great variety of abstract structures, including general first-order (or algebraic) structures, finite-type structures over the natural numbers, and structures of sets. These developments witnessed impressive success in obtaining various analogues of leading results from classical recursion theory.
Nevertheless, the point of my emphasis on concrete structures as a sine qua non for CT is to raise questions about proposed generalizations of it to abstract structures that have been suggested. In particular, I shall concentrate in sec. 4 on general theories of "computation" on first-order structures that descend from Friedman (1971) via his adaptation of the Shepherdson-Sturgis register machine approach (equivalently, the Turing machine approach) on the one hand, and that of Tucker and Zucker (1988, 2000) via "While" schemata on the other. I shall argue (as Friedman already did) that the proposed generalizations are more properly examined under the concept of algorithmic procedures, which are meaningful for abstract structures (or "data types") since algorithms are independent of the means by which individual data items and the operations on them may be represented. As will be explained at the end of sec. 4, significant efforts have been made to answer the question, "What is an algorithm?,"
leading to quite different conclusions, among them by Moschovakis (1984 Moschovakis ( , 2001 ) and Gurevich (2012) . In view of the controversy, it may be premature to propose a general associated version of CT for algorithms, though wide classes of algorithms may be candidates for such. In particular, Tucker and Zucker (op. cit.) have formulated a thesis for algebraic algorithmic procedures on abstract structures that deserves special consideration under that heading.
Finally, by comparison with these, sec. 5 reviews a general notion of recursive definition applied to suitable second-order structures, and a general thesis RT related to such is proposed for consideration.
Before turning to this material, one may well ask: What purpose is served by the questions of formulation and justification of these theses? We should not expect a single answer in each case, let alone a single overall answer; here are a few. In the case of CT itself, we had the historical pressure on the negative side to demonstrate the effective unsolvability of the Entscheidungsproblem in logic and, subsequently, many more examples of that in mathematics. On the positive side, it was and continues to be used to provide a solid foundation to informal proofs of computability, i.e. to justify "proofs by Church's Thesis." (And for Gödel, it was used to bolster his conviction that mind is not mechanical, via the incompleteness theorems and the identification of formal systems in their most general form with Turing machines.) Moving on to the proposed extension of notions of computability to abstract structures, a prime structure of interest is that of the real numbers (and relatedly the complex numbers), the arena of numerical analysis (aka scientific computation). Among the concerns here are to understand its limits and to provide a unified foundation. Moreover, as we shall see, a crucial issue is to separate conceptually algebraic methods from analytical ones. In addition, the latter are relevant to questions as to whether and in what sense the laws of physics are mechanical.
More generally, it is important to separate and refine concepts that are often confused, namely those of computation procedure, algorithmic procedure and recursive definition that are the primary concern of this article. Those who are philosophically inclined should find interest in these case studies in conceptual analysis (aka explication of informal concepts) both settled and unsettled. Finally, it may be hoped that satisfactory progress on these questions would help lead to the same on concepts of feasibility in these various areas, concepts that are wholly untouched here.
Recursion and computation on the natural numbers, and the Church-Turing
Thesis. The question as to which forms of definitions of functions on the natural numbers are finitistically acceptable was an important issue in the development of Hilbert's program in the 1920s. In the views of the Hilbert school this certainly included the primitive recursive functions (going back to Dedekind), but was not limited to such once Ackermann produced his example of a non-primitive recursive function. Formally, that was given by a nested double recursion, but it could also be analyzed as a recursion on the ordinals up to ω 2 . Hilbert's unsupported claim (1926) Dawson (1993) and Sieg (2003 Sieg ( , 2005 it turned out that Gödel misremembered some essential points. Herbrand's letter to Gödel informally proposed a characterization of the extent of the finitistically acceptable functions in terms of recursive definitions via a single formal system of arithmetic with quantifier-free induction and axioms for a sequence of functions f n satisfying three conditions on successive quantifier free axioms for the f n , of which the main one is:
We must be able to show, by means of intuitionistic [finitary] formulation, he made a crucial conceptual shift there from the question of characterizing the totality of finitistically acceptable functions to that of characterizing the totality of functions given by a "finite computation" procedure, despite his clear reservations both about the possibility of such and of general recursion in particular as a prime candidate.
Church was bolder:
We now define [sic!] the notion … of an effectively calculable function of positive integers by identifying it with the notion of recursive function of positive integers (or of a λ-definable function of positive integers). (Church 1936, p. 356) Church had previously proposed to identify the effectively calculable functions with the λ-definable ones, but by 1936 he could depend on their co-extensiveness with the general recursive functions established in Kleene (1936 Kleene ( , 1936a This argument was soon to be extended by the most significant step in the analysis of the concept of effectively calculable function on the natural numbers, namely that made by Turing (1936-37) . To be noted is that Turing conceives of the calculations as being carried out by an (abstract) human being following a fixed finite set of instructions or routine using a finite set of symbols specified in advance, via entering or deleting the contents of the workspace given by a potentially infinite set of symbol locations or cells. The confluence argument was bolstered by Turing's (1937) proof of the equivalence of his notion of computability with that of λ-definability. Church quickly accepted Turing's analysis of effectively calculable as the preferred notion of the three then available. As he wrote in his review of Turing's paper: [Turing' s notion] has the advantage of making the identification with effectiveness in the ordinary (not explicitly defined) sense evident immediately⎯i.e., without the necessity of proving preliminary theorems. (Church 1937) Gödel, too, accepted Turing's explication of effective calculability, but by when is not clear. In the unpublished lecture designated *193? in Gödel (1995) ⎯probably prepared in 1938⎯he describes the notion of general recursive function, and then writes, "[t]hat this really is the correct definition of mechanical computability was established beyond any doubt by Turing" (Gödel 1995, p. 168) . The first evidence of his view in print appears briefly at the beginning of his remarks before the 1946 Princeton Bicentennial, where he speaks of "the great importance of the concept of general recursiveness (or Turing's computability)" because of the independence of the concept of calculability in a formal system from the formalism chosen (cf. Gödel 1990, p.150) . Later, in his June 1964 Postscript to Gödel (1934) , he addresses the concept on its own terms as follows:
Turing's work gives an analysis of the concept of "mechanical procedure" (alias "algorithm" or "computation procedure" or "finite combinatorial procedure"). This concept is shown to be equivalent with that of a "Turing machine". (cf. Gödel 1986, p. 370)
As described in sec. 1 above, it was Kleene (1952) beyond the argument by confluence, among others, to more principled arguments for CT, but that work was still informal and did not go far enough to capture CT itself. The first significant step in that direction was made by Gandy (1980) which, together with its successors to be described below, may be construed as following a more axiomatic approach, in the sense that one (cl)aims to isolate basic properties of the informal notion of effective calculability or computation and proves that any function computed according to those conditions is computable by a Turing machine. As one sees by closer inspection, all the axioms used by the work in question take the notion of finiteness for granted, hence may be construed formally as carried out within weak second-order logic.
To begin with, Gandy asserts (as he did again in Gandy (1988) and that the behavior of the device is deterministic, though calculations may be carried out in parallel.
Gandy enlarges on the discreteness aspect in a way that is particularly useful for our purposes below.
Our use of the term "discrete" presupposes that each state of the machine can be adequately described in finite terms. … [W]e want this description to reflect the actual, concrete, structure of the device in a given state. On the other hand, we want the form of the description to be sufficiently abstract to apply uniformly to mechanical, electrical or merely notional devices. We have chosen to use hereditarily finite sets; other forms of description might be equally acceptable. We suppose that the labels are chosen for the various parts of the machine⎯e.g., for the teeth of cog wheels, for a transistor and its electrodes, for the beads and wires of an abacus. Labels may also be used for positions in space (e.g., for squares of the tape of a Turing machine) and for physical attributes (e.g., the color of a bead, the state of a transistor, the symbol on a square). (Gandy 1980 p. 127 , italics mine)
The main result of Gandy (1980) is a theorem justifying Thesis M, namely that what can be calculated by a mechanical device satisfying his four basic technical principles is computable on a Turing machine.
The arguments for Thesis T and Thesis M have been simplified and analyzed in some detail by Sieg (2002 Sieg ( , 2002a to the effect that in carrying out effective calculations, one is restricted by certain boundedness, locality and determinacy conditions, working throughout with finite symbolic configurations, either sequentially in the human case or in parallel in the machine case. As later explained by Sieg, Gandy machines may be characterized axiomatically on the basis of the following idea:
The machine has to recognize all the patterns (from a bounded set) in a given finite configuration, act on them locally in parallel, and assemble the results of these local configurations into the next configuration. As in the case of Turing computers, the configurations are finite but unbounded; the generalization is simply this: there is no fixed bound on the number of patterns that such configurations may contain. (Sieg 2008, sec. 2. 3)
Yet another approach to establish a version of CT from some basic postulates for quite general mechanisms is that due to Dershowitz and Gurevich (2008) . 6 The mechanisms in question are called Abstract State Machines (ASMs); fundamental to this work is that of Gurevich (2000) in which it is argued that sequential algorithms are captured by Sequential ASMs. As with the efforts of Gandy and Sieg described above, the reader must be referred to these articles for the details of the formulations and the arguments. One point, though, to be noted for the following is that Dershowitz and Gurevich (2008) The work by Gandy, Sieg, Dershowitz and Gurevich described in the preceding must be valued for taking the task of providing a precise conceptual analysis of CT seriously via the axiomatic approach. It may be questioned whether any of these yet reaches the desired degree of evidence, in other words of being close to compelling on
inspection. But what is common to these axiomatic approaches and cannot be denied is that the sine qua non of CT is that there is no calculation without representation. That is, the data with which one works consists of finite symbolic configurations where the symbols (or labels) are drawn from some finite set S given in advance. These represent finite concrete configurations such as finite linear inscriptions by human beings, or mathematical configurations such as finite trees or graphs, or states of various kinds of mechanisms such as described in the quote above from Gandy (1980) p. 127. More abstractly, Gandy considered finite symbolic configurations to be themselves represented in the hereditarily finite non-empty sets over the basic set S of symbols, though I think representation in the hereditarily finite non-empty sequences over S would be more appropriate since that gives an order in which things must be read; of course, each can be coded in the other. The operations on finite symbolic configurations must be limited to purely formal transformations following inspections and appropriate tests. Thus the claim here is that a general discussion of CT as it applies to computation over arbitrary structures only makes sense when applied to computation over concrete structures whose elements are finite symbolic configurations of one sort or another and that posit appropriate tests and operations on such. For a systematic treatment of computability on concrete structures see Tucker and Zucker (2006) . 8 The literature on generalized recursion theory is very extensive and could use an up-todate survey. Lacking that, some initial sources can be found in the bibliographies in the works of Barwise (1975 ), Fenstad (1980 , Sacks (1990) , and Tucker and Zucker (2000) .
referred to that for more details. What is discussed here⎯but not there⎯are proposed generalizations of CT to structures that need not be concrete. I shall consider two such below, one (implicitly) due to Blum, Cucker, Shub and Smale (1997) and the other (explicitly) due to Tucker and Zucker (1988, 2000) . I shall argue that these are more appropriately to be viewed as theses for algorithms.
An important starting point is the notion of computability on an arbitrary algebraic structure made by Friedman (1971) 
FAP(N) = FAPC(N) = FAPS(N) = FAPCS(N).
Trivially, in general for any structure A we have the inclusions,
FAP(A) ⊆ FAPC(A) ⊆ FAPCS(A), and

FAP(A) ⊆ FAPS(A) ⊆ FAPCS(A).
It is proved in Moldestad et al. (1980a) that for each of these inclusions there is a structure A which makes that inclusion strict.
An alternative approach to computability over arbitrary algebraic structures is provided in a usefully detailed expository piece, Tucker and Zucker (2000) that goes back 
While*(A) = FAPCS(A).
Thus we have a certain robustness (confluence of ideas) for notions of computation on abstract algebraic structures, depending on the choice as to whether or not to include the natural numbers or finite sequences.
The first interesting special non-concrete case to which these notions may be applied is the structure of real numbers; this is of particular significance because it is the principal domain for numerical analysis (aka scientific computation). One approach to the foundations of that subject is given by a model of computation over the reals due to Blum, Shub and Smale (1989) ⎯the BSS model⎯subsequently worked out at length in the book, Blum et al. (1997) . Actually, the model is divided into two cases, the finite dimensional one and the infinite dimensional one. In the first of these, the reals are treated as a purely algebraic structure, namely the ordered field R = (R, 0, 1, +, -, ×, −1 , <), while in the second case, one also computes with arbitrary finite sequences of reals. According to Friedman and Mansfield (1992) A major obstacle to reconciling scientific computation and computer science is the present view of the machine, that is, the digital computer. As long as the computer is seen as a finite or discrete object, it will be difficult to systematize numerical analysis. We believe that the Turing machine as a foundation for real number algorithms can only obscure concepts. Toward resolving the problem we have posed, we are led to expanding the theoretical model of the machine to allow real numbers as inputs. (op. cit., p. 23)
An analogy (pp. 23-24) is made with Newton's problem of reconciling the discrete corpuscular view of matter that he accepted with the mathematics of the calculus that he found necessary to describe bodies in prima facie continuous motion; the resolution came via idealized infinitesimal masses. Now our suggestion is that the modern digital computer could be idealized in the same way that Newton idealized his discrete universe. … Moreover, if one regards computer-graphical output such as our picture of the Mandelbrot or Julia sets with their apparently fractal boundaries and asks to describe the machine that made these pictures, one is driven to the idealization of machines that work on real or complex numbers in order to give a coherent explanation of these pictures. For a wide variety of scientific computations the continuous mathematics that the machine is simulating is the correct vehicle for analyzing the operation of the machine itself.
These reasonings give some justification for taking as a model for scientific computation a machine model that accepts real numbers as inputs. (op. cit., p. 24)
What is ignored in this analogy is that on the BSS model of computation, the relation of order and hence that of equality between real numbers is taken as total and decidable by the idealized machine, and so one is immediately led to discontinuous functions, such as step functions. The idea that one can "pick up" any two real numbers, each of which in general requires an infinite amount of information to specify it, and tell whether they are equal or not can't be justified by the "in the limit" analogy. So the BSS notion fails to provide a genuine notion of computation on the real numbers for which a version of CT would be claimed to hold, let alone non-concrete structures in general.
The question whether there is a sensible generalization of the Church-Turing Thesis to abstract structures is addressed directly by Tucker and Zucker (1988), pp. 196ff and again in Tucker and Zucker (2000) , pp. 493ff. In the latter it is said that the answer to the question is difficult to explain fully and briefly so that only a sketch is given, and the reader is referred back to the former for more details. Though the later publication is a bit more succinct than the earlier one on this issue, I didn't find that it leaves out any essential points, so I shall use that as the reference in the following. 9 The authors begin with the statement of a "naïve" generalized CT for abstract algebras, namely that "[t]he functions that are 'effectively computable' on a many-sorted algebra A are precisely the functions that are While* computable on A." This is immediately qualified as follows:
[T]he idea of effective calculability is complicated, as it is made up from many philosophical and mathematical ideas about the nature of finite computation with finite or concrete elements. For example, its analysis raises questions about the mechanical representation and manipulation of finite symbols; about the equivalence of data representations; and about the formalization of constituent concepts such as algorithm; deterministic procedure; mechanical procedure; computer program; programming language; formal system; machine; and the functions definable by these entities. … However, only some of these constituent concepts can be reinterpreted or generalized to work in an abstract setting; and hence the general concept, and term, of 'effective computability' does not belong in a generalization of the Church-Turing thesis. In addition, since finite computation on finite data is truly a fundamental phenomenon, it is appropriate to preserve the term with its established special meaning. (Tucker and Zucker (2000) , p. 494, italics in the original.)
In other words, these authors are in complete agreement with my view asserted at the end of the preceding section. Nevertheless, they go on to formulate three versions of a generalized CT not using the notion of effective calculability, corresponding to the three perspectives of algebra, programming languages, and specification on data types; only the first of these is relevant to the discussion here. Namely: This goes back to the work of Tucker (1980) on computing in algebraic structures; cf.
also Stoltenberg-Hansen and Tucker (1999) . Hermann's algorithm for the ideal membership problem in K[x 1 ,…,x n ] for arbitrary fields K is given as a paradigmatic example, but there is no principled argument for this thesis analogous to the work of Gandy, Sieg, Dershowitz and Gurevich described in the preceding section. One may ask, for example, why the natural number structure and arrays are assumed in the TuckerZucker Thesis, and why these suffice beyond the structure A itself. Moreover, nothing is said about assuming that the equality relation for A is to be included in it, even though that is common in algebraic algorithms. Finally, one would like to see a justification of this thesis or possible variants comparable to the ones described for classical CT, both informal and of a more formal axiomatic kind.
In any case, the Tucker-Zucker Thesis and supporting examples suggest that all the notions of computability on abstract first order structures considered in this section should be regarded as falling under a general notion of algorithm. What distinguishes algorithms from computations is that they are independent of the representation of the data to which they apply but only require how data is packaged structurally, i.e. they only need consider the data up to structural isomorphism. Friedman was already sensitive to this issue and that is the reason he gave for baptizing his notion using generalized register machines, finite algorithmic procedures:
The difference between [symbolic] configuration computations and algorithmic procedures is twofold. Firstly, in configuration computations the objects are symbols, whereas in algorithmic procedures the objects operated on are unrestricted (or unspecified). Secondly, in configurational computations at each stage one has a finite configuration whose size is not restricted before computation. On the other hand in algorithmic procedures one fixes beforehand a finite number of registers to hold the objects. Thus for some n, at each stage one has at most n objects. (Friedman 1978, p. 362 ).
The general question, "What is an algorithm?" has been addressed by Moschovakis (2001) and Gurevich (2012) (both under that title), among others, but with very different conclusions. 10 In his sec. 6, Gurevich criticizes Moschovakis' answer on several grounds among which that distributed algorithms do not fall under the latter's central notion of recursor. Moreover, even those algorithms that fall under the notion of recursor may do so by losing certain essential aspects of the procedure in question.
Whether or not one agrees with all of Gurevich's critiques of Moschovakis' analysis, in my view that is more appropriately to be considered under general theses for recursion that are taken up in the next section. In contrast to Moschovakis, Gurevich asks whether the notion of algorithm can be defined at all; his answer is "yes and no". On the negative side, he writes:
In our opinion, the notion of algorithm cannot be rigorously defined in full generality, at least for the time being. The reason is that the notion is expanding. Concerning the analogy of algorithms to real numbers, mentioned in sec.1, Andreas Blass suggested a better analogy: algorithms to numbers. (Moschovakis 1989) .
Clearly, all this require deeper consideration, and I must leave it at that.
Recursion on abstract structures.
Let us return to the claim of Blum et al. (1997) that the BSS model of computation on the reals (and complex numbers) is requisite for the foundations of the subject of scientific computation. That was strongly disputed by Braverman and Cook (2006) , where the authors argued that the requisite foundation is provided by a quite different "bit computation" model that is prima facie incompatible with the BSS model. It goes back to ideas due to Banach and Mazur in the latter part of the 1930s, but the first publication was not made until Mazur (1963) . In the meantime, the bit computation model was refined and improved by Grzegorczyk (1955) and independently by Daniel Lacombe (1955) in terms of a theory of recursively computable functionals. Terminologically, something like "effective approximation computability" is preferable to "bit computability" as a name for this approach in its applications to analysis.
This competing approach was explained in Feferman (2013) in rough terms as follows. To show that a real valued function f on a real interval into the reals is computable by effective approximation, given any x in the interval as argument to f, one works not with x but rather with an arbitrary sequential representation of x, i.e. with a Cauchy sequence of rationals ⟨q n ⟩ n ∈ N which approaches x as its limit, in order to effectively determine another such sequence ⟨r m ⟩ m ∈ N which approaches f(x) as limit. The sequences in question are functions from N to Q, and so what is required is that the passage from ⟨q n ⟩ n ∈ N to ⟨r m ⟩ m ∈ N is given by an effective type-2 functional on such functions. Write T for the class of all total functions from N to N, and P for the class of all partial functions from N to N. By the effective enumeration of the rational numbers, this reduces the notion of effective approximation computability of functions f on the reals to that of effective functionals F from T to T, and those in turn are restrictions to T of the partial recursive functionals F′ (from P to P ) whose values on total functions are always total. 11 It may be shown that by the continuity in the recursion theoretic sense of partial recursive functionals we may infer continuity in the topological sense of the functions f on the reals that are effective approximation computable. Thus step functions that are computable in the BSS model are not computable in this sense. On the other hand, the exponential function is an example of one that is computable in the effective approximation model that is not computable in the BSS model.
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11 Note that a partial recursive functional F need not have total values when restricted to total arguments. 12 There is a considerable literature on computation on the real numbers under various approaches related to the effective approximation one via Cauchy representations. A more comprehensive one is that given by Kreitz and Weihrauch (1984, 1985) and Weihrauch (2000) ; that features surjective representations from a subset of N N to R.
Bauer (2000) introduced a still more general theory of representations via a notion of realizability, that allows one to consider classical structures and effective structures of
The reader must be referred to Blum et al. (1997) and Braverman and Cook (2006) for arguments as to which, if either of these, is the appropriate foundation for scientific computation. 13 I take no position on that here, but simply point out that we have been led in a natural way from computation on the reals in the effective approximation sense back to the partial recursive functionals F on partial functions of natural numbers. Now Kleene's principal theorem for such functionals is the "first" Recursion Theorem, according to which each such F has a least fixed point (LFP) f, i.e.
one that is least among all partial functions g such that g = F(g) (Kleene 1952 p. 348 ).
This is fundamental in the following sense: the partial recursive functions and functionals are just those generated by closing under explicit definition and LFP recursion over the structure N. For, first of all, one immediately obtains closure under the primitive recursive schemata. Then, given primitive recursive g(x, y), one obtains the function Bauer and Blanck (2010) . The work of Pour-El surveyed in her article (1999) contains interesting applications of the effective approximation approach to questions of computability in physical theory. 13 Cf. also Blum (2004) , to which Braverman and Cook (2006) responds more directly.
not only with given functions over A but also given functionals at any level in that hierarchy. On the other hand, Platek showed that in the special case that the initial functionals are of type level ≤ 2, everything of type level ≤ 2 that can be generated via explicit definition and LFP recursion in higher types from that data can already be generated via explicit definition and LFP recursion at type level equal to 2. Platek's approach using the full hierarchy of hereditarily monotonic functionals allowed him to subsume and simplify Kleene's theory of recursion in finite types using hereditarily total functionals as the arguments of partial functionals defined by certain schemata (Kleene 1959 ). 14 Later, Kechris and Moschovakis (1977) showed how to subsume Kleene's theory under LFP recursion at type level ≤ 2 by treating the finite type structure as a many-sorted first-order structure (with infinitely many sorts). Moschovakis (1984 Moschovakis ( , 1989 14 Platek (1966) also used the LFP approach to subsume recursion theory on the ordinals under the theory of recursion in the Sup functional.
Let us note two comparisons of ACPs with other approaches. First is the following result due to Xu and Zucker (2005) : if A is an N-standard structure with arrays, then While*(A) = ACP(A). Secondly, we have a matchup with the Moschovakis (1984) theory of recursors by the result of Feferman (1992a) sec. 9 that the ACPs are closed under simultaneous LFP recursion. In the particular case of the structure N of natural numbers, the arguments above in connection with Kleene's First Recursion Theorem show that the partial functions and functionals generated by the abstract computation procedures are just those that are partial recursive. This shows that the effective approximation approach to computation on the reals is accounted for at the second-order level under ACP(N), while the Xu-Zucker result shows that the BSS model is subsumed at the first-order level under ACP(R).
Clearly it is apt to use the word 'abstract' in referring to the procedures in question since they are preserved under isomorphism. But given the arguments I have made in the preceding sections, it was a real mistake on my part to use 'computation' as part of their designation, and I very much regret doing so. A better choice would have been simply to call them Abstract Recursion Procedures, and I have decided to take this occasion to use 'ARP' as an abbreviation for these, in place of 'ACP', thus ARP(A) in place of ACP(A). The main point now is to bring matters to a conclusion by using these to propose the following thesis on definition by recursion that in no way invokes the concepts of computation or algorithm.
Recursion Thesis (RT).
Any function defined by recursion over a first-order structure A
(with Booleans) belongs to ARP(A).
This presumes an informal notion of being a function f defined by recursion over a firstorder structure A the structure is assumed to include the Boolean constants and basic operations). Roughly speaking, the idea for such a definition is that f is determined by an equation f(x) ≃ E (f, x) .where E is an expression that may contain a symbol for f and symbols for the initial functions and constants of A as well as for functions previously defined by recursion over A. Now here is the way such a justification for RT might be It may be that {y : y  x} is empty if f(x) is defined outright in terms of previous functions; in that case x is minimal in the  relation. In the case it is not empty, we may make a similar argument for f(y) for each y  x, and so on. In order for this to terminate, the  relation must be well-founded. Next, take F to be the functional given by F(f, x) = E(f x , x); F is monotonic increasing, because if f ⊆ g then f x = g x . So F has a LFP g. But The reason for restricting to first-order structures A in the formulation of RT is so as not to presume the property of monotonicity as an essential part of the idea of definition by recursion. I should think that all this can be elaborated, perhaps in an axiomatic form, but if there is to be any thesis at all for definition by recursion over an arbitrary first-order structure (with Booleans), I cannot see that it would differ in any essential way from RT. If there is a principled argument for assuming monotonicity of the functionals in a given second-order structure then we would also have a reasonable extension of RT to such.
